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Soviet intelligence and the 1957 Syrian Crisis 
 
This article assesses a claim by Khrushchev that warnings from the Soviet 
intelligence services enabled to him to deter a Turkish invasion of Syria in 1957. 
The article shows that the United States and Turkey did aim to overthrow the 
Syrian government, with the Turks massing an invasion force on Syria’s border. 
Soviet intelligence detected this threat and was able to alert Khrushchev, who 
took diplomatic and military countermeasures. However, while the Soviet 
intelligence services did provide advance warning, Khrushchev overestimated the 
extent to which the United States was committed to a Turkish invasion.  
 
The Syrian Crisis in the autumn of 1957 was the most serious Cold War confrontation in the 
Middle East between the Suez Crisis and the Six Day War. It centred on an alleged Western 
plot to attack Syria and topple a newly installed pro-Soviet government in Damascus. 
Turkish, Soviet and American military units were mobilised and deployed on the borders of 
Syria and Turkey and the foreign ministers of the superpowers traded angry accusations at the 
United Nations. The crisis blew over within a few months but it laid the foundations for a 
strategic partnership between Russia and Syria that has endured to this day.  
In the past 25 years archival research has revealed much about American and British policy 
in the Syrian Crisis but the Soviet position and the thinking of the Soviet leader, Nikita 
Khrushchev, remain largely unexplored.1 In particular, historians have not considered the role 
played by the Soviet intelligence services even though Khrushchev claimed in his memoirs 
that intelligence precipitated his actions in the crisis.2 He wrote that in 1957 ‘it became 
known to us, from reliable reports coming through our intelligence services, that the United 
States was about to organize an invasion of Syria, making use of Turkey, as well as Iraq and 
Iran, for that purpose.’3 Khrushchev described how he tried to deter the attack by applying 
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countervailing military pressure on Turkey; Soviet and Bulgarian troops ostentatiously held 
manoeuvres on Turkey’s northern and western borders and Moscow announced that it was 
sending its most experienced military commanders to the border areas. Shortly before the 
Turkish invasion was due the Soviet Union declared that it ‘would come to the aid of Syria 
militarily’.4 According to Khrushchev, at this point the United States advised Turkey to halt 
its preparations for war and subsequently the plans for invasion were cancelled altogether. In 
his memoirs Khrushchev hailed the outcome as a ‘bloodless victory’ for the Soviet Union, 
adding that ‘we restrained the aggressors…preventing the destruction of the Syrian republic, 
and we accomplished it without a war.’5 
Prima facie, this is an example of successful intelligence led deterrence. The Soviet 
intelligence services warned Khrushchev of an impending attack on a friendly state and 
enabled him to take action and deter aggression. In this sense, the Syrian Crisis was a victory 
for Soviet intelligence as well as for the Soviet Union in general.  Obviously, it is necessary 
to treat Khrushchev’s claims with a degree of caution, especially since he dictated his 
memoirs ten years after the crisis without access to government documents and relying solely 
on memory.6 Still, Khrushchev’s autobiography was not state sanctioned propaganda – in fact 
the Soviet authorities tried hard to suppress it. Moreover, public statements made by Soviet 
policymakers during the Syrian Crisis partially corroborate Khrushchev’s account for they 
repeatedly accused the United States and Turkey of plotting an attack on Syria, although they 
did not disclose that Soviet intelligence had uncovered the plan. The American and Turkish 
governments vehemently denied that they were intriguing against Syria but subsequent 
research by Matthew Jones, David Lesch, Douglas Little, Bonnie Saunders and Salim Yaqub 
has shown that the United States and Turkey did indeed conspire to remove the Syrian 
government.7  
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This article will therefore investigate whether Khrushchev’s version of events is correct and 
if Soviet intelligence did help forestall a Western attack on Syria. The paper will first closely 
examine the development of American policy towards Syria between August and October 
1957, as this will then make it possible to check the veracity of Soviet claims. It will also 
identify potential Soviet intelligence sources and see if the intelligence services did 
accurately inform Khrushchev of American and Turkish activities.  Finally, the article will 
explain how the Soviet Union responded to the perceived threat to Syria. Restricted access to 
archival sources in Russia and Turkey imposes some limitations on the study; both countries 
have released hardly any of the documents relating to the crisis and the archives of the Soviet 
intelligence agencies, the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Main Intelligence 
Agency (GRU), remain closed to Western researchers. In addition, many American and 
British documents connected to covert operations against Syria are still retained. 
Nevertheless, by using the available American and British sources and some published 
Russian material, a picture can be built up of the role played by Soviet intelligence.  
Syria had been a point of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union since 
1955. Left wing governments in Damascus had aligned themselves with President Gamal 
Nasser of Egypt and were antagonistic to the conservative Arab states, Israel and European 
imperialism. Syria also established close ties with the Soviet Union and signed trade and 
arms agreements with the Soviet Bloc, which were regarded with deep suspicion by 
Washington.  The differences between the United States and Syria publicly came to a head in 
August 1957 because of a series of moves by the Syrian government.8 Syria signed a new 
economic agreement with the USSR and the commander in chief of the Syrian army was 
replaced by a reputed communist. The Syrian authorities then announced on 12 August that 
they had discovered an American plot to overthrow the government and they expelled three 
officials from the American embassy in Damascus. The United States firmly rejected these 
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accusations but fragmentary evidence suggests that American officials had been covertly 
conspiring with Syrian army officers.9 The Americans had already been party to an abortive 
attempt to topple the Syrian regime in 1956, codenamed Operation Straggle.10  
The Syrian government’s actions in August provoked a strong reaction in Washington and in 
the region. American policymakers believed that pro-Soviet elements had effectively taken 
control of the Syrian state and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was not prepared to 
tolerate a communist outpost in the heart of the Middle East.11  Four pro-Western countries 
bordering Syria - Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon - were equally mistrustful and fearful of 
the Syrian regime.  The Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, considered that Syria had 
been turned into a Soviet satellite.12 Turkey already shared a border with the USSR and in 
1945 it had experienced Soviet military pressures and demands for political concessions. 
Now it was confronted with a pro-Soviet state on its southern frontier, raising the spectre of 
an attack from two sides. Syria had been involved in subversion in Jordan and Lebanon and 
its brand of radical Arab nationalism posed a mortal threat to the Iraqi monarchy. All four 
countries saw the Syrian government as highly dangerous for the area.13 
The United States was reluctant to intervene directly to topple the Syrian regime but it was 
prepared to back Syria’s neighbours if they took military action. American President Dwight 
Eisenhower thought that the United States should urge friendly Arab states to ‘band together, 
and using such excuses as necessary, move to eliminate the Syrian government.’14 Dulles 
believed that the Iraqis were ready to act and it was decided to send an envoy, Loy 
Henderson, to the region for secret consultations with America’s allies. Dulles and 
Eisenhower instructed Henderson to make clear that any military intervention must have a 
plausible cause.15 Furthermore the Iraqis should not go in unless it was certain that Turkey 
was ready to help them. The Turks could transfer military equipment to the Iraqis and mass 
troops on the border to divert and stretch the Syrian armed forces. Eisenhower stressed that 
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United States should not be seen as taking the lead although as precautionary measures he 
deployed the American Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and sent aircraft to the 
Adana airbase in southern Turkey.  
Henderson flew out to the Middle East and for over a week he discussed the Syrian issue with 
the regional leaders. In Istanbul on 25 August he met with Menderes, King Faisal of Iraq, 
Iraqi Crown Prince Abd al-llah, and King Hussein of Jordan.16 After further talks with 
Menderes in Ankara, Henderson then travelled on to Beirut to speak to the Lebanese 
president and the Acting Iraqi Foreign Minister, Ali Mumtaz el-Daftari.17 Finally, he returned 
to Istanbul for a last round of discussions with Menderes and Abd al-llah on 2 September.18 
Henderson’s telegrams back to Washington were guarded in their language but he appears to 
have faithfully followed the instructions given to him by Dulles and Eisenhower. While he 
told the Turks and Arabs that the United States was not trying to push them into a particular 
course of action, he made it clear that Washington would support them if they moved against 
Syria, with the caveat that any operation would have to be justifiable at the United Nations.19  
Mumtaz later confided to a British diplomat that Henderson had pressed the Iraqis to take 
action against Syria as soon as a pretext could be found which would stand up in the UN 
Security Council.20 Both the Iraqis and Turks asked Henderson for American military 
advisers to give them strategic and tactical advice.21 
However, there was an unexpected difficulty. During the talks, it emerged that the Iraqi and 
Jordanian governments were more divided and hesitant about using force than the Americans 
had anticipated. While Faisal and Abd al-llah were prepared to intervene, Mumtaz and the 
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi were much more cautious..22 It was feared that the 
Iraqi people would oppose an attack on Syria.23 As result, Henderson was unable to extract a 
firm commitment from the Iraqis or Jordanians to take military action. By contrast Menderes 
appeared determined to act, with or without the Arab states, and he asked Henderson whether 
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the Americans would back Turkey if it tried to eliminate the Syrian regime by itself.24 From 4 
September the Turkish General Staff began to move infantry, tanks and aircraft close to 
Syria’s northern frontier, supposedly as part of military exercises.25 The Turks had used such 
deployments in the past as a form of coercive diplomacy against Syria, the most recent 
occasion being only few months earlier over an internal crisis in Jordan, but Henderson 
formed the impression that the Turks were likely to take military action on their own if there 
was no alternative.26 The Turkish armed forces were large and well equipped and more than a 
match for the Syrian military but unilateral Turkish intervention could be politically counter-
productive because for centuries the Ottoman Turks had been the imperial masters of the 
Arabs. Dulles was concerned that if Turkey intervened on its own it could rally all Arab 
populations in support of the Syrian government.27 The CIA thought that most Syrians would 
oppose Turkish intervention.28  
Eisenhower and Dulles responded to this predicament in two ways. Firstly, they sought close 
consultation and cooperation with Britain which was allied to Iraq and Turkey through the 
Baghdad Pact. The British were hostile to the Syrian government and Dulles had kept Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan informed of the Henderson mission.29 They agreed to set up a 
secret Anglo-American Working Group in Washington which would devise policy options 
for Syria.30 Secondly, the United States again encouraged the regional powers to move 
against the Syrian government, in the hope that they could agree on a combined Arab-Turkish 
operation which would be less toxic to Arab public opinion. On 10 September Washington 
passed on oral messages to the governments of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey offering 
American support over Syria.31 Abd al-llah was effectively told that the United States would 
regard subversion by Syria as grounds for self-defence by Iraq under Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter.32 If one or more of Syria’s Arab neighbours took military action on this 
basis the United States would give them military supplies, economic assistance and 
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diplomatic cover at the United Nations. The US would also commit its own armed forces if 
the Arab states or Turkey were subsequently attacked by the Soviet Union. In the meantime it 
would continue to deploy the Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. The oral message 
given to the Turks was similar in language yet it was ambiguous on the crucial question of 
whether the United States would back unilateral Turkish intervention. It advised the Turks to 
only act as reinforcement for Arab military action in Syria but at same time it stated that the 
United States would support Turkey at the United Nations and protect it against Soviet attack 
if Ankara ‘should feel compelled to react to armed provocations [from Syria] which implied a 
serious threat to its own national integrity and independence’.33 
Historians of the Syrian Crisis have interpreted this message in different ways. Lesch and 
Saunders believed that Eisenhower and Dulles were giving a green light to Menderes to use 
force against Syria but Yaqub has argued that they were actually trying to hold back the 
Turks while still maintaining confidence in the American security commitment to Turkey.34 
The ambiguity in the message may also have reflected uncertainty on the part of Dulles over 
what attitude to take towards unilateral Turkish intervention. While Eisenhower wanted to 
restrain the Turks, at times Dulles appeared tempted by the Turkish option despite the 
political difficulties it would cause in Arab states.35 Washington added to the ambivalence 
around its policy by agreeing to provide senior military advisors to both Iraq and Turkey.36 
General Verdi Barnes was sent out to Baghdad while General Armistead Mead went to 
Ankara.37  
American policy towards Syria was formulated in late August and early September under 
conditions of intense secrecy. The State Department set up a special security category for the 
handling of sensitive telegrams and memoranda relating to Syria and kept its messages to 
Menderes and the Arab leaders strictly secret.38 Although the press did pick up on 
Henderson’s trip to the Middle East, the State Department portrayed it as merely a fact 
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finding mission to appraise the situation in Syria and take soundings on Turkish and Arab 
opinion.39 Yet in spite of this cover of secrecy, by early September the Soviet government 
appeared to have found out what had transpired on Henderson’s tour. The Soviets would 
naturally have been suspicious of American intentions toward Syria after the coup plots in 
1956 and August 1957, especially as the Eisenhower administration had toppled left wing 
governments before, in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. Henderson had even been the 
American ambassador in Tehran when the Iranian government was overthrown. But the 
Soviets also seem to have had concrete intelligence about the Henderson mission. 
Khrushchev would later brief the Egyptian journalist Mohamed Heikal that ‘[t]he Americans 
are threatening Syria. They asked Jordan and Iraq to attack Syria – we have documents to 
prove this.’40  
This intelligence may have come from several different sources. As the Syrian Crisis 
unfolded there was speculation in the Western press and diplomatic circles that the Soviets 
had acquired some of Henderson’s papers during his visit to Turkey. The French newspaper 
Le Monde ran a story of an American diplomatic bag going missing when a boat disappeared 
while crossing the Bosphorus.41 The bag supposedly contained an account of Henderson’s 
conversations with Menderes. Similarly, the NATO Secretary-General, Paul Henri Spaak, 
heard from a ‘serious’ source that a suitcase containing Henderson’s papers had been stolen 
in Ankara.42  But neither of these reports was true. The American embassy in Ankara assured 
British diplomats that it had not lost any diplomatic bags. 43 Moreover, Henderson had carried 
no documents on his tour, made no notes and only communicated orally with the Turkish and 
Iraqi leaders. Another possibility is that the Soviets discovered the nature of Henderson’s 
talks through an on-going signals intelligence operation against the American embassy in 
Moscow. Between 1953 and 1964 the KGB was able to intercept and decrypt diplomatic 
telegrams between the State Department and the Moscow embassy, thanks to bugging 
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devices in the embassy.44 However, in the Syrian Crisis the United States government shared 
relatively little information with the embassy. The State Department did forward to Moscow 
two of Henderson’s telegrams from Beirut but these did not reveal in any detail the American 
plans for Syria.45   
It is more likely that the Soviet intelligence came from regional sources. A number of Iraqi 
officials were told of what Henderson had said in Istanbul, including the ambassador in 
Ankara who was mistrusted by the former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said.46 Nuri was 
afraid that the ambassador would pass the information on to the Egyptians. Certainly by early 
September Iraqi sources had helped the Egyptian government piece together a picture of what 
Henderson had been trying to do.47 Privately Syrians officials also claimed that Iraqi Prime 
Minister Jawdat had told them about plans discussed in Turkey for the overthrow of the 
Syrian government, either by the Arab states or through Turkish military action.48 
Nonetheless, even if this is true it is not clear how extensively Syria and Egypt shared their 
intelligence with the Soviet Union.  
Americans and British policymakers were more exercised by possible intelligence leaks from 
Turkey. During the crisis the Turks denied that they had lost any of their own secret papers 
but the American embassy in Ankara questioned this denial and thought that they might have 
lost important documents.49 The British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, was worried about 
the security of Turkish diplomatic communications. In talks with Dulles and senior American 
officials in mid-September Lloyd pointed out ‘that the Turkish cyphers were not reliable’ and 
recommended directing the Turks to only use couriers when communicating with Iraq.50  This 
recommendation seems to have been put into effect, for the British ambassador to Iraq noted 
in early November that for several weeks there had been a complete ban on the use of 
Turkish or Iraqi cyphers between Ankara and Baghdad.51 Lloyd’s fears were well founded for 
the KGB was targeting Turkish diplomatic traffic. Ilya Dzhirkvelov, who served in the KGB 
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Second Chief Directorate between 1953 and 1955, recounted in his memoirs secretly 
breaking into the Turkish embassy in Moscow and photographing the diplomatic cypher 
tables.52  
Whatever the source of its intelligence, the Soviet government began a concerted effort in 
early September to protect the Syrian regime. Articles in the Soviet newspapers Pravda, 
Izvestia and Red Star accused Henderson of preparing aggression with Syria’s neighbours.53 
Then at a press conference in Moscow on 10 September the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei 
Gromyko, announced that Henderson’s tour was connected with plans to prepare armed 
provocations on the Syrian border and thereby create the grounds for military intervention in 
Syria.54 Gromyko said that the masterminds behind this plan had wanted to set Iraq, Jordan 
and Lebanon on Syria but they knew that if they did, the Arab governments would face 
problems with their own populations. So the organisers had turned to Turkey to execute their 
plan and the Turks were massing troops on the frontier. After denouncing this conspiracy 
Gromyko made veiled warnings of a Soviet military response; asking how Turkey would feel 
if troops were concentrated on its borders and implying that it would be difficult to localise a 
Turco-Syrian war. The next day the Soviet Premier, Nikolai Bulganin, sent Menderes a 
diplomatic note which made similar accusations and threats. Bulganin asserted that a ‘certain 
role is being assigned to Turkey in the plans to unleash military action against Syria’ and 
cautioned the Turks not to intervene, adding that ‘the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent 
to these events.’55   
When speaking privately to Western visitors to the USSR Soviet leaders repeated the same 
message and hinted that they had intelligence about the Henderson mission. On 9 September 
the Soviet Deputy Premier, Anastas Mikoyan, told American Senator Allen Ellender that ‘We 
have strong evidence that the United States is trying to instigate trouble’ in the Middle East.56  
A week later Khrushchev expounded on this theme with Aneurin Bevan, the shadow foreign 
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secretary for the British Labour Party.57 Meeting Bevan in Yalta Khrushchev declared that he 
had ‘irrefragable evidence’ that Henderson had been sent to the region to organise a political 
coup d'état in Syria with the aim of setting up a pro-Western government.58 The new Syrian 
regime would then engineer a pretext for Arab and Turkish troops to enter the country in 
support. Khrushchev emphasized that the Soviets would not accept this manoeuvre and said 
menacingly that if it was attempted, ‘we will show the Turks how they can bleed.’59 On 27 
September it was the turn of Eleanor Roosevelt, the widow of former American President 
Franklin Roosevelt. When she interviewed Khrushchev in Yalta the Soviet leader remarked 
that ‘Mr Henderson had a rather dirty mission’ and called upon Dulles to reveal what 
Henderson had in view when he visited Turkey and Lebanon.60 
These warnings from the Kremlin did not deter the United States or Turkey. Washington 
continued to search for ways to remove the Syrian government, although there were no easy 
alternatives.  On 18 September the Anglo-American Working Group had produced its secret 
report on policy towards Syria and the favoured option was to stimulate unrest in Syria and 
create border incidents between Syria and Iraq or Jordan which could provide a pretext for 
Iraqi and Jordanian military intervention under Article 51.61 The Turks could assist as 
required but the Working Group saw unilateral military action by Turkey as a last resort 
because it would probably alienate Arab opinion. Yet despite the American promises of 
support to Baghdad, it appeared less and less likely that the Iraqi government would take on 
such a role. Public opinion was being stirred up by Arab nationalist radio propaganda from 
Syria and Egypt and the Iraqi Interior Minister was concerned about the potential internal 
security situation and very survival of the government if it ordered an invasion of Syria.62 
Jawdat was still reluctant to use force and he was bolstered by the efforts of King Saud of 
Saudi Arabia, who was trying to reduce the tensions between Syria and its neighbours 
through diplomacy. Saud and Jawdat visited Damascus at the end of September and to the 
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consternation of the Turks, Jawdat said publicly that Iraq would support Syria against 
aggression.63 
Menderes, on the other hand, was much more resolute. The Turks were preparing plans for an 
invasion of Syria and redeploying their military units so they would have the forces available 
to carry out the operation.64 For want of a better alternative Dulles toyed with the idea of 
using the Turkish army to solve the Syrian problem. At a meeting with Lloyd with on 21 
September to consider the Working Group’s report Dulles pointed out that ‘the only people 
with the resources and the courage to act were the Turks.’65 The next day he told the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the director of the CIA that further study should be done of how Turkey 
could intervene without causing damage to the Western position in the Arab world. 66 He 
believed that it might just be possible to make a Turkish operation acceptable.  By early 
October however, the Secretary of State was considerably more pessimistic, foreseeing a 
‘period of almost unending turmoil in the Middle East’ if Turkey invaded Syria.67 
While Dulles mulled over unilateral action by the Turks, the Turkish General Staff pressed 
ahead with its preparations for invasion, helped by General Mead and other American 
military advisors. The Working Group was given a report from Mead on 26 September which 
stated that the final Turkish military plans would be submitted by 1 October.68 American 
advisors would assist in the planning at all stages. The planned operation envisaged bringing 
the Turkish army to the brink of an assault on Damascus just three days after the initial 
invasion. By 28 September Turkish ground units would be in position for starting the 
operation although air and naval elements would not be ready until 15 October. This did not 
necessarily mean that a Turkish invasion of Syria was imminent; while Menderes appeared 
determined the American ambassador detected hesitation and doubts amongst the Turkish 
military.69 But the capability was there if Ankara decided to give the order. A British 
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intelligence review on 3 October declared that Turkish forces as presently deployed could 
launch a surprise attack on Syria.70  
Through intelligence sources the Soviet leadership was aware of the military planning and 
preparation going on in Turkey. Khrushchev told the Syrian Deputy Prime Minister in 
December 1957 that the Soviets had known about ‘the decision of the Turkish General Staff 
to prepare an attack on Syria.’71 In his memoirs Khrushchev claimed that Moscow had even 
acquired a copy of the Turkish plan for the invasion of Syria. He wrote that: 
A detailed plan came into our hands, a plan not only for the invasion itself but 
for the buildup to it, and we had no doubt about the accuracy of the 
information we received. We knew what forces Turkey intended to use, where 
and how they were concentrated, and how many tank and infantry divisions 
and how much artillery would take place in this action.72 
Khrushchev described the Turkish invasion plan as designed to reach Damascus as quickly as 
possible and put an end to the Syria government. As the Soviets knew in advance the stages 
of Turkey’s preparation for the invasion and the intended launch date, they could monitor 
Turkish progress and take action.  Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs that ‘[w]e were very 
well informed about what was happening in Turkey. With great accuracy our people kept 
Moscow updated.’73  
Khrushchev responded to the Turkish threat by stepping up his defence of Syria. On 7 
October he gave a blistering interview in Moscow to the New York Times journalist James 
Reston.74 In the interview Khrushchev blamed the American government for creating a crisis 
over Syria, saying that Henderson had tried to organise an attack on the country by the Arab 
states.75 Then when the Arab governments proved reluctant to act, the United States had 
pushed Turkey into a preparing a war with Syria. Khrushchev decried the Turkish build up 
and implicitly threatened Soviet military intervention if the Turks invaded. He pointedly 
observed that by moving their troops against Syria the Turks were laying bare part of their 
border with the Soviet Union and said that ‘[t]hey should not do that. They are very weak. 
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Turkey would not last one day in case of war’.76 Khrushchev warned Reston that ‘[i]f war 
breaks out, we are near Turkey and you are not. When the guns begin to fire, the rockets can 
begin firing, and then it will be too late to think about it.’77 That evening at a dinner at the 
East Germany embassy Khrushchev publicly made very similar threats against Turkey.78  
It was notable that in the Reston interview Khrushchev again implied that the Soviets had 
evidence of American plotting against Syria and he called on the United States Senate to 
investigate the instructions that Dulles had given to Henderson for his tour.79 Khrushchev 
suggested that Dulles should be forced to swear under oath and tell the truth about his 
instructions to Henderson. These comments by Khrushchev, combined with Mikoyan’s 
remarks to Senator Ellender in early September, made the American ambassador in Moscow 
suspect that the Soviets had some specific information which they considered genuine, 
perhaps from intercepts of Arab communications.80 Nevertheless, the State Department 
issued a public statement on 10 October which stoutly denied that the United States was 
pushing Turkey into a war with Syria.81 It also described Khrushchev’s allegations about 
Henderson’s mission as ‘completely unfounded’.82 Leading senators scorned the suggestion 
that they should investigate Dulles’ instructions to Henderson.83  
More though was to come from the Soviet side. On 10 October Khrushchev and the 
Presidium of the Central Committee discussed the ‘Syrian Question’ and agreed that the 
Soviet Union should take additional measures to support Syria.84  Moscow would send letters 
to the British Labour Party and the socialist parties of Belgium, Denmark, France, Holland, 
Italy, Norway and West Germany urging them to restrain their governments from aggressive 
action in the Middle East. Presumably Khrushchev had in mind here the Labour Party’s vocal 
opposition to the British military attack on Egypt in the 1956 Suez Crisis. The USSR would 
also inform the Syrian and Egyptian governments of its estimate of the situation around Syria 
based upon the latest evidence. Gromyko would raise the Syrian issue at the United Nations 
15 
 
General Assembly and the Defence Ministry would organise military manoeuvres by the 
Soviet and Bulgarian armed forces to act as a deterrent to Turkey. Finally, the Presidium 
instructed the KGB to submit proposals for ‘publicising in the United States material relating 
to plans for an attack on Syria’.85  
Over the next two weeks most of these measures were put into effect. Moscow sent out letters 
to the European socialist parties on 11 October warning of a plot against Syria.86 These did 
not rouse much open opposition to American and Turkish policy but the letter to the Labour 
Party did have an impact on Bevan, since it reinforced what Khrushchev had told him at 
Yalta in September. Bevan urgently sought talks with senior British ministers, calling the 
Soviet allegations ‘extremely serious’ and on 14 and 15 October he met consecutively with 
David Ormsby-Gore, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Macmillan.87 Bevan recounted to 
the two men his discussion with Khrushchev. He said the Soviet leader had seemed 
convinced that Henderson was sent to the Middle East to arrange a coup in Syria which 
would be followed by a call for help from the new regime to Arab countries and then military 
intervention by Turkey. Bevan asked for assurances that the Soviet allegations were untrue. 
Macmillan replied that as far he was aware there was no truth in Khrushchev’s story and 
Ormsby-Gore categorically denied the claims.   
But in actual fact, Khrushchev’s description of the Henderson mission was at least partly true, 
as Macmillan probably knew. Indeed, behind the scenes the Foreign Office was worried by 
Bevan’s report of his conversation in Yalta because it appeared to confirm that Soviet 
intelligence was obtaining information via the Turks. On 14 October the Foreign Office 
telegraphed Lloyd (who was at the United Nations in New York) and informed him that  
We are, however, seriously concerned at Turkish security. There seems to be a 
steady leak to the Russians. This is confirmed by Mr Bevan’s account of his 
interview with Khrushchev, when the latter gave him a detailed and accurate 
account of Mr Henderson’s discussions in Istanbul.88 
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The Foreign Office was studying this problem and intended to produce a paper on it for 
consultation with the United States.89 American policymakers shared these concerns about 
poor Turkish security. That same day Under Secretary of State Christian Herter lamented to 
Dulles that on the Syrian issue ‘it is obvious that any move we make in connection with 
Turkey is relayed pretty accurately to Moscow with great rapidity.’90  
Khrushchev’s statements helped convince the Americans and British to rule out the option of 
unilateral Turkish intervention in Syria. On 11 October the Working Group had produced a 
further report which recommend adopting a policy called ‘containment plus’ for Syria.91  
Under this longer term approach the pro-Western Arab states would try to incite unrest within 
Syria and create conditions in the future where military intervention would be possible. The 
Working Group concluded that a Turkish invasion was ‘undesirable at this stage’, partly 
because many Arab states had been obliged by public feeling to come out in support of 
Syria.92 Indeed on 13 October Egypt sent a token force of soldiers to Syria to help defend the 
country against Turkey.93 But the Working Group also thought Turkish action was 
undesirable because Khrushchev had tied the Soviet Union’s prestige to the Syrian 
government’s survival and thereby increased the risk of Soviet military intervention. The 
same point was made by Herter, who advised Dulles that the USSR had definitely committed 
its prestige through Khrushchev’s interview with Reston and its diplomatic note to Turkey.94  
Herter predicted that if the Turks went into Syria the Soviet Union would feel compelled to 
attack Turkey, with the all the attendant potential for escalation up to a general war between 
the superpowers. Dulles was much more sceptical about the risk of Soviet intervention but 
going through the Working Group’s papers with Lloyd on 16 October he accepted the 
conclusion that unilateral Turkish military intervention was undesirable.95 Containment plus 
became the new favoured scheme. Informing the Turks of this decision was a delicate task 
though as Dulles and Lloyd felt that they had to avoid giving them any impression of being 
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intimidated by the Soviet threats. It would thus take nearly a week for Dulles and the 
Working Group to compose a suitable message for Ankara.96  
Ironically, just as Dulles decided to restrain the Turks the crisis escalated with the Syrians 
and Soviets taking the dispute to the United Nations. On 15 October the Syrian government 
appealed to the UN Secretary General claiming that it was threatened by Turkish forces 
concentrating on its border.97 The Syrians asked for a United Nation commission to 
investigate the situation in the border area and report back to the General Assembly. 
Gromyko strongly supported their appeal. In a letter to the President of the General Assembly 
he endorsed the Syrian request for a UN investigatory commission and proposed that if 
Turkey did invade, United Nations’ member states should immediately render Syria armed 
assistance. 98 In that situation, he wrote, the Soviet Union was ‘prepared to take part with its 
forces in suppressing aggression and punishing the violators of peace’, a clear warning of 
possible Soviet military intervention.99 
In his letter Gromyko alleged there was ‘reliable information’ that the Turkish General Staff 
with American advisors had devised detailed plans for an invasion of Syria.100 TASS issued 
an authorised statement on 18 October which set out the supposed invasion plan: the Turks 
would invade Syria on a wide front from the Mediterranean coast to the Euphrates River. 101  
One regiment would swing west and capture the port of Latakia, making it possible for the 
American Sixth Fleet to bring in ships. The main Turkish invasion force would strike south, 
first taking Homs and then push down to Damascus. Gromyko also detailed the composition 
of the Turkish military force massed on the border which would carry out the attack.102 
Supposedly known as the ‘Hatai Mobile Group’, it consisted of an infantry division, four 
separate infantry regiments, a gendarme division and three armoured brigades. The total 
strength was 50,000 men with approximately 500 tanks and self-propelled guns plus artillery 
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and aircraft. Gromyko claimed that the planned launch date for the invasion was immediately 
after general elections in Turkey on 27 October. 
The Soviets did appear to be genuinely concerned about the threat to the Syrian government. 
Tom Driberg, the Chairman of the British Labour Party, lunched with Khrushchev in 
Moscow on 19 October and he advised the Foreign Office that the Soviet leader ‘believed 
passionately that there was a Turco-American plot against Syria.’103 Khrushchev told Driberg 
that the United States and Turkey were planning a lightening attack on Syria which would be 
over before the Security Council could make a decision. Khrushchev may also have divulged 
more about the sources of his information. Driberg asked him if he would show the members 
of a future Labour government the documents which proved there was a Turco-American 
plot. According to Driberg, Khrushchev demurred, saying if the Soviets ‘showed the 
documents that they had got from the Turkish G.H.Q [General Headquarters] it would give 
away the Generals from whom they got them.’104 
Driberg is a problematic source, however, because he had been compromised by the KGB in 
1956 and acted as an agent of influence for them.105 The account of the meeting he gave to 
the Foreign Office therefore may have contained Soviet disinformation. Yet there were other 
signs that the USSR had obtained incriminating documents from the Turkish military. The 
Washington Post reported on 19 October that the Soviets had given Syrian and Egyptian 
diplomats at the United Nations copies of documents stolen from the Turkish defence and 
foreign ministries which revealed a plan to invade Syria.106 The Turkish documents referred 
to the Hatai Mobile Group and the forces allocated to it. The Soviets had told the Syrians and 
Egyptians that these were some of the documents which Khrushchev had alluded to in his 
New York Times interview with Reston. It is also possible that they were the Turkish invasion 
plans which Khrushchev claimed in his memoirs to have received from Soviet intelligence. 
Of course, the documents could have been KGB forgeries intended to manipulate the Syrian 
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and Egyptian governments into believing there was an active threat from Turkey which only 
the USSR could repel. But the plan described by Gromyko in his letter to the United Nations, 
apparently on the basis of these documents, matches what is known of Turkish and American 
activities. American advisors had secretly helped the Turkish military prepare plans for an 
invasion of Syria and the plan was to quickly advance on Damascus. Turkey had assembled 
an invasion force and Eisenhower later admitted in his memoirs that the Turks increased their 
strength on the border to 50,000 men, the same figure given by Gromyko.107 The purported 
invasion date looks incorrect because there is no evidence that the Turks were set to invade 
after their general elections. Still, the Turkish force was in a position to attack Syria and the 
Turks did plan ground and air manoeuvres in the area after 27 October, which the Soviets 
may have interpreted as cover for an invasion.108 
Interestingly, the State Department seemed to think that the Soviets did have Turkish 
documents but it downplayed their significance, arguing that they were long standing military 
contingency plans rather than specific plans for toppling the current Syrian government. On 
23 October the Times revealed that for a week rumours had been circulating in the State 
Department of an espionage leak in Turkey which had enabled the Soviets to procure plans of 
the Turkish General Staff for operations against Syria.109 But these were portrayed in the 
article as ‘theoretical plans’; paper exercises that that any general staff would possess.110 
Dulles privately told the American Ambassador to the United Nations that ‘no doubt the 
Soviets have gotten hold of war plans which we all have. There is a difference between 
having them and putting them into operation. The proof of attacking is not in plans – it is in 
the political decision.’111 Dulles was right about this distinction but if Khrushchev had found 
out the aims of the Henderson mission, it is easy to see why he would fear that the Turkish 
war plans and military build-up presaged an invasion of Syria.  
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The Syrian complaint led to a debate in the UN General Assembly where Gromyko made a 
fiery speech reiterating the accusations against the United States and Turkey. Gromyko also 
warned that if there was an attack on Syria the USSR would ‘take all the necessary steps to 
extend assistance to the victim of aggression.’112 His words were backed up by a show of 
force. The Soviet Ministry of Defence announced combined exercises by elements of the 
Trans-Caucasian Military District, which bordered Turkey, and the Black Sea Fleet.113 
Marshall Konstantin Rokossovsky, the Deputy Defence Minister and one of the most 
successful Soviet military leaders in World War Two, was appointed commander of the 
Trans-Caucasian Military District.114 The Turks had already detected exceptional military 
activity taking place in southern Bulgaria.115 But in truth, the danger of war was starting to 
recede, for on 22 October the Americans finally delivered their message to the Turks calling 
for restraint. Acting on instructions from Dulles, the American ambassador advised Menderes 
that in view of the charges made against Turkey in the UN debate, ‘no action should be taken 
which enemies of Turkey could use as attempt to demonstrate that charges have 
substance.’116 Menderes believed that the danger from Syria was greater than ever but he was 
prepared to accept this advice and promised not to make any move without the closest 
consultation with the United States.117 
From intelligence sources Khrushchev may have learnt that the Americans had counselled 
restraint to Menderes. He wrote in his memoirs that after the USSR indicated it would defend 
Syria the United States advised the Turks to cease their preparations for war.118 He made 
similar claims about the Americans restraining Turkey in an interview for an Egyptian 
newspaper in November 1957 and in talks with the Syrian Deputy Prime Minister the 
following month.119 In any case, after the American message was delivered Khrushchev 
moved to defuse tensions and de-escalate the crisis. On 29 October the Soviet leader 
surprised everyone by turning up at the Turkish embassy in Moscow for a national day 
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reception.  He exuded goodwill to gathered Western diplomats and called for a toast to ‘no 
war between the Governments represented here’.120 When asked by reporters if his presence 
was a sign of lessening tension in the Middle East Khrushchev said that ‘[i]f you think of 
peace as the needle in a compass, you may say it has swung a little bit towards peace.’121 
Khrushchev was still convinced that the Americans and Turks had been conspiring against 
Syria; at the reception the Turkish ambassador tried to assure him that Turkey had no 
aggressive intentions towards Syria but Khrushchev snapped back that the Soviet government 
had ‘material and irrefutable proof’ that Henderson had laid plans in Turkey for the 
overthrow of the Syrian government.122 But by this point Khrushchev was confident that he 
had deterred the Turkish invasion of Syria. On 2 November he told the Egyptian Defence 
Minister, Abdel Hakim Amer, that the attempt to mount an armed attack on Syria had failed 
and boasted that the Soviets and Arabs had won the battle without having to have a war. 123 
Khrushchev correctly predicted to Amer that henceforth the United States and Turkey would 
rely on internal subversion to topple the Syrian government rather than using external 
military force.  
After Khrushchev’s visit to the Turkish embassy the Syrian Crisis wound down.124 The 
debate in the General Assembly concluded on 1 November without a vote and the Syrians 
indicated to the Secretary General that they no longer wanted a UN commission to investigate 
the border situation. From 19 November the Turks started to withdraw their forces from the 
Syrian frontier. For a while the United States and Britain covertly pursued the containment 
plus policy, fostering the creation of an Arab Committee in Beirut which would look for ways 
to incite internal unrest in Syria.125 But the dynamics of situation changed completely in 
February 1958 when Syria united with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic, eliminating 
any scope for the West to install a government in Damascus.  
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In the end then, should the 1957 Syrian Crisis be seen as a victory for the Soviet intelligence 
services? Broadly, the account given by Khrushchev in his memoirs was correct. There were 
clear indications at the time that the KGB had uncovered the Western plans against Syria. In 
private conversations Khrushchev asserted that he possessed ‘irrefragable evidence’ and 
‘irrefutable proof’ of American and Turkish plotting and he told Heikal he had documents 
proving the United States had asked Iraq and Jordan to attack Syria. The Soviet allegations 
against the United States and Turkey also generally match up with what is known of 
Henderson’s discussions in the Middle East and Ankara’s invasion preparations. Most 
tellingly of all, British and American policymakers themselves believed that the Soviets had 
acquired accurate intelligence about the Henderson mission and Turkish planning. The 
Foreign Office thought Khrushchev gave Bevan a true account of Henderson’s secret talks in 
Istanbul and Dulles assumed that the Soviets had obtained Turkish military plans, even if 
they were just contingency plans. The British and Americans strongly suspected that the 
Soviets had breached Turkish security and Khrushchev’s memoirs and contemporaneous 
press reporting and comments imply that the Soviets had an agent or agents with access to 
sensitive documents from the Turkish general staff and defence and foreign ministries. Given 
the vulnerability of Turkish ciphers, some material may also have come from KGB signals 
intelligence. Soviet intelligence thus seems to have penetrated the Western conspiracy against 
Syria and it was able to warn Khrushchev of a possible Turkish invasion. He could then take 
diplomatic and military countermeasures to defend Syria. To this extent, the Syrian Crisis 
was an example of intelligence led deterrence and intelligence had a greater influence on 
Soviet policy in the crisis than previously realised. 
In some respects, however, the Soviet intelligence picture may have been incorrect. In his 
memoirs Khrushchev included Iran in the plot to attack Syria but Iran did not feature at all in 
American plans and it does not border Syria. Soviet statements never mentioned Iranian 
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involvement so Khrushchev probably misremembered this point when later dictating his 
memoirs. More significantly, Khrushchev and Gromyko both alleged that Turkey was about 
to invade Syria. The Turkish military had drawn up invasion plans and positioned its forces 
so that it could carry out an operation, but the limited evidence presently available does not 
confirm whether Menderes had taken the political decision to launch an invasion or if it was 
imminent. It is possible then that Khrushchev and/or the KGB overestimated the danger of 
invasion. Khrushchev also seems to have misjudged the extent to which the Americans were 
committed to a Turkish attack. For Dulles and Eisenhower a unilateral Turkish operation was 
always the least preferred option because they feared it would inflame Arab opinion. Dulles 
was only briefly tempted by Turkish military action when Iraqi intervention looked 
impossible in September 1957. Finally, it was not just the Soviet counter-measures which 
convinced the United States to restrain Turkey - the growing Arab support for the Syrian 
government was important as well. Intelligence did assist Khrushchev in the Syrian Crisis but 
the ‘bloodless victory’ was not down solely to his actions. 
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